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An architecture of the body is emerging out of theories of 
biology, complexity, and systems through the use of an 
evolving organism as its metaphor. Autopoiesis is the term 
used by biologists to describe the realm of existence for a 
living organism as it slides between the interchange of 
structure and information. Incoming information is filtered 
through the organism for its usefulness in the art of staying 
alive. Structural or organizational changes evolve as the 
organism adjusts to new information. To remain a viable 
organism—to survive—means that an entity must keep 
evolving without surrendering identity. Humans must 
maintain an embodied identity, often referred to as an 
organized self (Maturana & Varela, 1980, 1987), while 
viably exchanging information with other entities and the 
environment. This operation creates a topological boundary 
across which the communication takes place. 
 
Cognitive theorists and researchers have proposed that the 
animal condition is one of Embodied Realism; that is, 
animals such as we humans, are embodied, using our 
bodies to create basic metaphors, and, that we do this in a 
“real” world. The role of cognition in this equation is to allow 
humans the use of embodiment to explore abstract ideas 
through metaphor—such as “grasping an idea” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2003). In doing so, it allows the invention of an 
evolving language that refers to things “outside” our skin, 
like other entities and places. Autopoiesis describes the 
activities at the “edge” or boundary of an organism. The 
linguistic act can, therefore, be identified as fundamental 
medium for communication in the edge, between inside and 
outside, that assures the autopoiesis of place. 
 
In our own bodies, flesh is the biological manifest of the 
edge or boundary condition. Our understanding of flesh is 
that it is another of our organs; and at the same time, all 
organs are also bounded by flesh. It serves as a porous 
filter, delicate and complicated—it is our body boundary. 
The “flesh” or the lived body (Merleau-Ponty, 1968) is 
moreover, an inbetween concept that articulates the 
subjective mind to the objective world. It bridges the 
boundaries separating inside from outside. Thus, it could 
act as a metaphor for introducing the notion of edge in 
architectural place. The edge itself then, embodies the 
embodied being. Buildings have boundaries of foundation, 
wall, or roof, parts of which could be thought of as the 
“skin.” In today’s practice, the various skins of a building 
have become more complicated and porous as the field of 
architecture extends itself into “systemic” conditions, within 
and without. It follows then that the body survives the 
interaction and communication between mind and the 
external world if it inhabits the edge of place embodying 
localized boundary metaphors.  
 
Architecture is beginning the process of aligning itself with a 
new moral code—one that is inclusive of our biological 
reality, the embodiment of ideas, systemic evolution, and 
ecological necessities. This paper is situated within this new 
moral code of systemic ecological and biological 
interactions. 
 






Systems come in two types, simple and complex. Simple 
systems are those where the complexes of elements 
standing in interaction do not rely upon information, cause, 
or interaction from outside the system. These systems—for 
example, an automobile engine—refer to predictable 
behavior because there are a limited number of variables in 
cause and effect relationships. Simple systems are 
determinant and cannot adapt or evolve 
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(www.complexityandeducation). Complex systems, in 
contrast, are open networks where elements stand in 
interaction and do exchange information, intentions, cause, 
or effect from or to the domains in which a system 
resides—generating a creative and active evolution. These 
systems have component parts yet the interactions and 
boundaries are complex—where does one system stop and 
another begin. The parts in complex systems do not have 
evident boundaries, it cannot be dismantled like an engine 
can, each part folds into the next neither ending nor 
beginning. Boundaries in complex systems become 
complex layers of bonding the network. In figure 1, the site 
plan of “Redgate House,”1 a design for the remodeling of a 
small bungalow and its property, for example, suggests that 
the boundaries of each place are systemically complex—
where does one area begin and another end (Fig.1)? 
 
Figure 1: The site plan of the Regate House manifests 
complex boundaries: where does one thing end and 
another begin? 
 
The notion of fluid boundaries in a complex system 
accounts for its internal dynamism and synthetic continuity 
among the elements, which prompt a creative 
transformation within the system. The process of self-
modification and self-organization inside the system 
perpetuates the mutual interaction with the environment 
that results in the invention of new structures (Bergson, 
1922). Therefore, since the organism is thought of as an 
                                                          
1 “Redgate” was a bungalow house owned by Thomas Hubka, 
who was an assistant professor at the University of Oregon in 
1970’s. The Regate House manifests itself an example that 
articulate the conception of cultivating “Significant form” of 
place and the process of constructing an embodied place and 
its networks—through the development of the presence of 
complex, living edges/boundaries. 
active participant in the evolutionary process, it establishes 
a divorce with the Darwinian conception of evolution in 
which the environment imposingly determines the change in 
the living beings. In contrast, the ‘mutual interpenetration’ of 
the living system with its milieu specifies a communicative 
domain, which leads to ‘mutual specification’ and 
‘codetermination’ (Varela et. al., 1993) in a non-hierarchical 
relation. This mutual specification, which represents 
continuity, movement and flux in an ever-changing flow, 
occurs at the intersection of the living system and the 
environment in an interstitial domain. 
 
The structure in a complex system is not a linear set of 
connections or dependencies; rather, it is described as a 
web of interdependences within a neighborhood of nested 
components. We imagine that each nested entity—each 
neighborhood—flows into other neighborhoods and to 
larger and more encompassing environments around the 
body—all systematically connected. A full understanding of 
our own body and knowledge about how it locates itself in 
place would assist designers in making compelling logical 
form and more holistic significant form (Langer, 1953). 
 
In architecture, we now know that we are responsible for a 
building “in place.” In today’s global context an ecological 
consciousness has emerged and we no longer can build 
merely to the site lines; now we ask ourselves where do the 
materials come from, how much does the building really 
cost in embodied energy, what is the footprint of this 
building on land, and on the resources of the land? No 
longer can we walk away from a completed project without 
monitoring its progress; that is, did we model the systems 
carefully and is it acting in place the way it was intended? 
 
Now we are concerned with the building in its ecological 
position “in” place. Do we take advantage of natural 
systems to make the building “work?” How does our project 
affect other places in the designed and natural 
environment? At the other end, we have become concerned 
with the human being who inhabits the building, and how 
the building affects his/her physical, psychological and 
behavioral state. Many of these questions are relatively new 
in the world of design and, as such, these queries are 
causing a change in the way we design and make places. 
Such a shift in industry ethics is a change in approach—one 
that acknowledges the interdependence of systems and the 
importance of boundary conditions. The boundary between 
us, the buildings that envelop us, and the environments that 
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contain this building, is fluid, defined by a series of 
transforming edge conditions. The most fundamental 
boundary between the lived body and inhabited place is the 
skin or the flesh. In language, this boundary often serves as 
a metaphor for understanding edge conditions betwixt two 
external entities. In effect our corporal body is the medium 
through which we understand abstract concepts, and the 
edge condition is frequently defined through its biological 
manifest (the skin or flesh, both literally and 
metaphorically). Linguistic act (or the body metaphors) is an 
illustration of the notion of flesh or the mind-body 
interaction. The corporeal body acts as a mediator that 
conveys ideas and concepts to the outside world. 
Therefore, in order to generate conceptual metaphors, the 
body should inhabit the edge condition in place. In this 
paper, we seek to understand the edge condition through 
its biological manifest—the flesh—via the linguistic act of 
creating conceptual metaphors, that is, embodiment of a 





To be autonomous and self-organizing beings humans 
must be bounded. Our autonomous boundary is our skin. 
Scientists tell us that the most complicated and rich 
information happens at the overlap of one system with 
another. For example, if we were walking in the forest and 
happened upon a meadow, if we choose to move towards 
the meadow the range of plant life, insect life, and 
interaction that might happen is concentrated at the edge. It 
is a difficult edge to define because the “inbetween” is 
difficult to judge; when have you “left” the forest and 
entered the meadow?  The edge condition of our bodies is 
a combination of the skin, always in transition, and our 
other system exchange capacities (vision, kinesthetic, 
audition, scent, and taste). Along with our other exchange 
routes, it is our body boundary. The flesh exists between 
our “in”-side and our “out”-side. Because the mind is 
embodied we think metaphorically, through our body 
orientations and actions. 
 
In Philosophy and the Flesh, Lakoff & Johnson make an 
argument for an “Embodied Realism” which discounts the 
idea of a reality that is divided into categories independent 
of the “specific properties of human minds, brains, or 
bodies” (1999, pp. xiv, 624). The core ontological 
assumption is that we are coupled to the world through our 
embodied interactions. The mind and the body are not 
separate entities, rather the mind is considered as 
embodied. In this sense, our conceptual structures can be 
understood as arising from our sensorimotor (combining 
sensation and movement) experience and the neural 
structures that give rise to it. Our mental structures become 
intrinsically meaningful by virtue of their connection to our 
bodies and our embodied experience, and reason is 
embodied because our fundamental forms of inference 
arise from sensorimotor and other body-based forms of 
inference. An intrinsic valuation of our spatial coordinates 
takes place once mediated through our bodies. 
 
One walks into the front of a church and finds oneself in the 
back of the sitting area, which “faces” the podium. Our 
inexact bisymmetry favors our “right” sides—we will say to 
someone that the book they are looking for is “right over 
there”…here you have a string of body metaphors…It does 
not matter if the book is actually to the left, we often even 
point a finger (usually a forefinger) when we say 
“right”…”over” is a term that is tied to how our bodies and 
other living entities move…and “there” is a reference to 
location in relation to our bodies which are “here.” Up is 
good; down is not so good. We use up and down as 
descriptive of emotional states, as directors or locators, and 
as good vs. bad. If we say, we stand side-by-side on an 
issue it means we agree or share, and mean to defend a 
“stance.” The body-based properties and basic level 
categories help us build, metaphorically, conceptual 
constructs in the abstract. 
 
Examples are everywhere; if you say to someone that: 
“I cannot grasp this theory.”—you are trying to pull some 
ideas out of another person’s mind or from the words on 
paper—or,  
“I cannot understand this theory”—by not “standing under” 
you mean you are not finding a way to support the ideas—
or, 
“I cannot fathom this theory”—you mean that somehow you 
cannot measure these ideas—or, 
“I cannot follow this theory”—you mean that you cannot 
navigate through these ideas—or, 
“I cannot decipher this theory”—you mean that you cannot 
make the ideas add-up to something. 
 
In addition to all the different ways of describing some 
confusion built into our expressions in language we also 
have to resort to metaphor to explain the metaphor; i.e. to 
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pull, support, measure, navigate, and add-up are all 
metaphors taken from our bodies in place and our 
environmental referrals to our embodiment. Often we cross 
sense modalities to express the same kind of abstracted 
idea; if you say that: 
 
This theory is unclear—it is sensory—you cannot see it. 
This theory is too hard—it is sensory—you cannot feel it. 
This theory is too deep—it is spatial—it is bottomless. 
This theory is beyond me—it is spatial—it has gone too far. 
Beyond the orientation metaphors the body boundary 
allows us to pursue the “out there” through embodied 
concepts of structural schema—“war is hell” is where one 
concept is structured through another powerful metaphor 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
 
We have a few famous structural metaphors in 
architecture— 
“…a building is a machine for living” or, 
“…less is more” or, 
“…architecture is frozen music”. 
 
There are also ontological metaphors where we try to make 
sense of the intangible things in the world through 
personification—“life cheated me”—is a way of 
understanding emotional or experiential domains. Buildings 
have been dubbed as: “ethereal”, “sublime”, “pleasing”, 
“brutal”, “plain”, and more. They have openings often called 
our eyes to the world—a building has a face, a building has 
skin, often a top, bottom, and sides. The places we make 
are often a reflection the kind of experience we allow our 
fully sensate bodies to have. 
 
 
Figure 2: Container Schema of the Regate House’s 
living space is defined by complex, living boundaries 
affording a sense of an enclosed entity and 
interaction, simultaneously.  
Cognitive theorists describe three basic schemas that are 
body based—the container schema, the periphery/center 
schema, and the source/path/goal schema (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 2003). The drawing of the Redgate House’s living 
room (Fig. 2) is a clear example of a container schema as 
well as the periphery/center schema. The house is a very 
small bungalow and this drawing presents studies of a 
remodeling.  The living space is small so the edge has been 
expanded to be an interactive realm. The center of the 
room has been supported by the complex periphery as the 
drawing indicates it is expanded and enriched by an 
exterior bay and an interior bay. The ability to occupy the 
edge is enriched by these design moves and its ability to 
act as a container and as a refuge. 
 
Complex systems share some principles that we can 
identify with: they must involve autonomous agents; in this 
case we are interpreting this as having “free will” even 
though we choose to have some external controls of laws 
and acceptable behavior standards, within these maxims 
we are free to move and act in our environments. Our acts 
in the environment are nonlinear—the whole is different 
from the sum of the parts. This can be explained by way of 
schema using source/path/goal; you might leave your office 
(source) with the express intention of going to the library 
(goal), however, the path may be littered with events or 
people that interrupt your intended goal. You might choose 
to join a friend for coffee that you have met along the path 
and not reach your goal at all, or at the least postpone the 
initial goal, or substitute another. An additional 
characteristic of complex systems is emergence; again, the 
parts are not equal to the whole; we cannot study the brain 
apart from the body because what emerges from 
embodiment in concert with place is our ability to think and 
communicate. In turn, we cannot study place apart from the 
body because what emerges from a systemic view is the 
complement of fully sensate understandings of what makes 
a place with significant form. We thus can experience 
significant form of place if we fully present ourselves as a 
lived body in place. 
 
 
The Body in Place, the Body for Place, 
the Body Dis-placed 
 
Western thinking has been flailing away at the traditional 
subject/object problem for centuries. Essentially, most 
science is practiced as if “an observer can, at least in 
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principle, be objective and disembodied” 
(www.complexityandeducation). Collier calls these the 
“archetypical tensions between the Universal and the 
Particular…where…unlike the pure consciousness of 
angels, we are embodied concrete particulars. Human 
nature is collective—we are social beings connected in a 
complex dance with others and our environments” (Collier, 
2000, p. 245). In his epic work of The Fate of Place Edward 
Casey fits the puzzle of embodiment with place. His 
intention is to clearly separate issues of place from space. 
Again, the problem of understanding embodiment comes 
from the deluge of Western philosophers as the 
subject/object problem. 
 
According to Casey, both Descartes and Kant share the 
view of a “matheisis universalis” (Casey, 1998, p. xiv) as a 
way of explaining extended space through abstract XYZ 
geometric axes. Some philosophers in denying the 
emptiness of space use the body as the measure of “place” 
or location through “qualities of direction, fit, density, 
contiguity, and interstice” (Casey, 1998, p. 645). We 
constantly use our bodies as locators; if center/periphery 
schema was to be explored we would have to know where 
a “body” could locate itself. In figure 3, you see the designer 
engaging the viewer by adding individual characters, not 
just for scale, but to help anyone viewing this abstract 
section as an inhabitable place. The edge condition is 
enriched as it is a library with a built-in bay for reading.  
Adding compelling characters allows the viewer a location, 
an ability to embody this potential place (Fig.3). 
 
gure 3: The Redgate House’s edging corner 
develops a place that allows for the body to inhabit 
as the measure of “place” or location. 
 are there only 
 
eas of the cognitive science has spanned the interface 
rnates 
e mind within the common ground of embodiment. Once 
 become more complex. Our 
teraction with the world around us is increasingly 
 
Fi
In his philosophy, Merleau-Ponty makes a case for the 
embodied nature of the visual and claims “quality, light, 
color, depth, which are there before us,
because they awaken an echo in our body and our body 
welcomes them” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, pp. xix, 228). In 
doing so he breaks away from Cartesian dualism of subject 
and object by introducing the notion of a living boundary—
flesh. In his seminal book, The Visible and the Invisible, he 
identified the flesh as an inbetween place as the boundary 
provides an overlapping domain for both subjective 
experience and objective existence. Merleau-Ponty used 
the term ‘atmosphere’, referring to the flesh as something 
neither object or idea, but a “possibility” of intertwined 
layers of body and the world. The flesh, then, acts as a 
metaphor for the edge of place in which the body does not 
serve as a container or instrument; rather it functions as a 
motivation for communication between inside and outside. 
The two dimensionality of the flesh is also conceived as the 
lived body that is simultaneously perceiving and perceived. 
 
According to Francesco Varela, following Merleau-Ponty, 
the emergence of the ‘embodied mind’ as the more recent
id
between the ‘disembodied observer’ and the ‘dis-worlded 
mind’. Varela has incorporated the notion of ‘enaction’ as a 
lived embodied action to the autopoiesis theory in order to 
question the viewpoint of a pre-given, perceiver 
independent world (Varela et all, 1993). In reality, as self-
organizing particulars—our bodies—are tools for examining 
the places we are in through extensive use of analogy, but 
more effectively, through metaphor. In putting the mind and 
body back together again as a circular never-ending living 
system in touch with other systems, going from place to 
place, we can envision a more complete architecture—one 
that embodies significant places in form and content. 
 
The notion of ‘lived body’ as the combination of Husserl’s 
“lived body” and Bergson’s “le vécu” or ‘the lived’ inca
th
we lose a sense of this carnal echo, we dissociate the 
visual from what it means to be human. It is the same 
concern that consumes the writings of Heidegger, Sartre, 
Foucault, and Derrida, although each of these writings has 
its own ideological agenda. 
 
With the technological advancements in the last century 
issues of embodiment have
in
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mediated and the boundary conditions have transformed. It 
is possible today to immerse ourselves in different realities 
simultaneously—through the internet we can browse the 
news in Asia, while listening to the Beatles on an ipod, and 
watching a soccer game on a high definition television. The 
different senses housed in our body can now live in parallel, 
but disconnected realities. The mind and body can live in 
different “worlds” where the body is dis-placed, and place is 
dis-embodied. We argue that as architects place can be the 
mediator between body and mind.  In “The Turning” 
Heidegger argues that “both our capacity for seeing and our 
capacity for hearing are perishing through radio and film 
under the rule of technology” (cited in Levin, 1993, p. 3). In 
the Dawn and Decline, Max Horkheimer blames 
technological advancements for human insensitivity, “as 
their telescopes and microscopes, their tapes and radios 
become more sensitive, and individuals become blinder, 
harder of hearing and less responsive” (1978, p. 192). 
Designers generally think their way through their pens and 
pencils—they imagine what it would be like to “embody” the 
place before them—to whisper life into abstraction. Now we 
have a chance to think that through the boundary condition 
we can also think systemically. 
 
Pallasmaa holds the ocularcentric bias and the consequent 
sensory imbalance responsible for the inhumanity of 
ntemporary architecture and cities. He claims that the “art 
ss a designer learns about the 
tentions of their clients and what they seek. They see the 
 but their ability to construct symbols 
nd their associated meanings is limited. The evolution of 
al. 
oth forms employ a logical structure for relating symbols to 
co
of the eye” has pushed us into isolation and detachment, 
creating imposing and thought-provoking structures that are 
not rooted in humanity. In this tradition the human body 
itself is abstracted to be used as a measure (proportions, 
units of measurement, etc.) or a metaphor (symbols, forms 
etc). As a result of this transgression, modernist design has 
“housed the intellect and the eye but left the body and the 
other senses, as well as our memories and dreams, 
homeless” (Pallasmaa, 1966, p. 6). Books such as 
Experiencing Architecture by Rasmussen (1962), Body, 
Memory, and Architecture by Bloomer (1977), and the 
Image of the City by Lynch (1960) have been some of the 
few significant efforts to address this lacuna. However, in 
the majority of mainstream literature, thought and design, 
the eye has continued to be “narcissistic, concerned only 
with self-expression, and detached from essential mental 
and societal connections, and nihilistic, deliberately 
advancing sensory and mental detachment and alienation” 
(Pallasmaa, 1966, p. 10). Thus, to design a place to have 
“Significant form,” the designer must think of creating a 
lived domain with tactility that is attentive to sensibilities.      
Significant Form 
 
Architectural design is an expression of proposed place. At 
the beginning of the proce
in
task, which might initially be a brief or a program, and must 
decide what this place should be like. Of course the 
designer does not come to the table without his or her own 
value system and an image bank of the significant places; 
the designer cannot mold the solution without reference to 
his or her past experiences. Places of significance are 
remembered and compared to what might be a future place 
in a complex dance of remembrance and possibilities 
(Downing, 2000). The resulting expressions are sketches, 
drawings, and virtual images of place; and, if the designer is 
successful—significant form. Thought is in the moment, 
expression is in time. The drawings present a symbol of 
how life can be lived. 
 
Symbol making is uniquely human. Other animals may be 
able to conceptualize,
a
symbols in higher-order consciousness (Edelman, 1992) 
serves the primary consciousness (that which is tied to the 
immediate and overwhelming present). Symbolization 
requires an ability to construct a socially based selfhood in 
order that the world is modeled in terms of “others.” A state 
of direct awareness of the relationship among past, present, 
and future can be achieved only through higher order 
consciousness. Without symbol, this capacity is impossible 
and cannot develop. The development and evolution of 
symbolic memory enables us to be humans who elaborate, 
refine, connect, create, and remember (Downing, 2000). 
 
In Philosophy in a New Key, Langer (1957) proposes two 
forms for human expression: discursive and presentation
B
whatever they are to mean. In language, the logical 
structure of discourse unfolds in a linear (or we say 
hermeneutic) manner, encompassing the ability to relate 
words and their meaning to concepts that they symbolically 
represent. The presentational form of expression is 
characterized by other art forms: music, painting, 
architecture, et cetera. A significant building or landscape is 
presented to us as an object or place; its sensate 
character—visual form and space, movement, sounds, 
texture, aromas—is its entire being. The logical structure is 
holistic, encompassing the ability to relate an experience to 
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the symbolic import it presents to consciousness. What 
emerge from experiences of significant form are the 
symbols of sentience (contact, retreat, participation, 
identity, love, grace, fear, sensuousness, intellect, intimacy, 
growth, expansiveness, reflection, communing, and more), 
of life in all its conflicts and meanings. Significant form acts 
to present to the mind, the memory of things, occasions, 
and parables of life (Downing, 2000, p. 71). In other words, 
we present in presentational form of place, we experience 
significant form of living domain, vital import of 
environmental presence.  
 
An example of significant form might be the American 
House through its historical evolution from its original, 
ostly European, birth. One of the first things that a 
 external views that are developed. Originally 
e “living room” was cut off from the back yard (Fig. 4). By 
 
i
f living space and an extension of edges lead the 
ouse to connect with the location by horizontal view. 
ncture.  Significant form of the edging interval manifests 
m
European will notice upon visiting an American house will 
be the tendency to be more horizontal than vertical. The 
reasons for this tendency comes from theoreticians like 
Andrew Jackson Downing who wrote in the 1850 in 
American Cottages and Farmhouses about how an 
American house should sit in the landscape, compared to 
European traditions or the early American “temple” houses 
of the northeast. Essentially he begins with the theory of 
“utility, truth, and beauty,” his conversion of “firmness, 
commodity, and delight” into a language that common folks 
could understand, but quickly moves to the landscape and 
the response to the quantity of landscape available to 
Americans at that early juncture. He suggests that the 
house should encompass and embrace the land and that 
the house should be formed as part of the land, sitting in it, 
not on it. Architects of the later 1800’s who designed in the 
“stick and shingle style” (Scully, 1971) further developed the 
horizontality of space and opened the plan further so that 
one could view the land and sea throughout many 
conjoined rooms making most of the views available 
throughout the first floor plan. Of course this continued as 
Frank Lloyd Wright began his path and took the horizontal 
to its limit. 
 
At “Redgate,” this “horizontal” view is engaged through 
internal and
th
adding internal windows and an extension off the back 
bedroom a full horizontal view was possible. As a small 
house there was no need for a second floor—accentuating 
the sense of reaching out to the landscape, connecting it 
through “wings” and deep porches or verandas (Downing, 
1850), that allowed for an edge condition to exist between 
house and landscape. Southern house plans were more 
formal, Downing called this house type a “villa” and 
pronounced it appropriate to its ecosystem; a hot and 
humid environment that called for floor to ceiling windows 
and doors (often with transepts), and often with two story 
verandas that would wrap around the house to keep the air 
as cool as possible as it moved across exposed skin. 




















If we focus on the edge, it becomes significant if it allows a 
symbol of spatial-relations to take place “in” a domain of 
ju
itself a medium of associative, spatial juxtapositions, 
manifestations of differences. In Steven Holl’s Kiasma, we 
see a completely different embracing of the boundary 
condition. In this museum, series of places flow into each 
other, and boundaries are defined not by walls and doors, 
but by changing sensory environments—dark and light, 
sounds and quiet, movement and stillness. It is an example 
of using technology to create boundaries that are tangible, 
but not material. The building itself sits on its landscape as 
a picturesque sculpture—defining its boundary in concrete 
terms. Yet every once in a while, within the building, the 
boundary is pierced, and large windows are used to 
reconnect the museum viewer with the world outside. The 
body in the Kiasma experiences its environments through 
carefully crafted boundary conditions, sometimes by 
sounds, sometimes by views, and sometimes by immersing 
in darkness so that the body boundary fuses with the space 
enveloping it. This reflects the relationship between 
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presentational forms of embodied, complex boundaries of 
interactions and the embodied aesthetics in places.  
 
 
Survival and the Edge of Place 
 
The aesthetics of embodied realism suggests that “survival” 
odity and 
light were thought of as necessary to the process of 
 
 Aldo van Eck (1968, p. 104), inbetween realms reconcile 
etached participation, and 
ace fabrication through their presence of environmental 
 
 a fireplace and an inglenook develop the 
ges of place for refuge. 
h c 
uilding skins, and other living, edging entities—perform as 
tal layers of interconnection, making us assimilate new 
formation and sustain our living in the complex system of 
would necessarily be a critical issue if comm
de
constructing places of significance rather than simply 
pleasant additions to a stripped-down version of “firmness.” 
In the Origins of Architecture Pleasure by Hildebrand (1999) 
the thesis is clear, to survive as a species we must make 
places of beauty, places that peek our curiosity and need 
for exploration, and that give us pleasure and comfort, 
prospect and refuge. The theory of prospect and refuge, if 
thought of as a continuous experience, suggests that the 
“edge” or overlap “between” two “systems” is the most 
complex location that can be held. At the edge of place, we 
are “inbetween”—realms where choice, pause, and 
detached participation is possible. At Redgate the modest 
addition of a fireplace, an old-fashioned inglenook, added 
an edge that could be occupied—the true refuge (Fig. 5-6). 
 
As edging intervals, inbetween domains are relevant to the 
conceptions of “manifestations of juxtapositions.” According
to
a spatial dichotomy and differences with transitional 
awareness, and therefore articulate “twin-phenomena” at 
once, “with respect to place and occasion.” To be 
experienced as a place, the inbetweens must be identified 
as a containment of interrelating edges between places as 
the whole, a body of living form of intervals defined by 
organized complexity of edges. 
 
Inbetween places, like other places, announce their own 
“significant forms” of pause, d
pl
tactility, associations, and juxtaposition demands. 
Inbetween places with tactile presence attract us to pause 
at the edges. A pause at a boundary is important because 
our meaningful experience of itineration through place is 
established into episodes: prior undergoing, present pause, 
and fore-preparation. A pause at an inbetween domain 
allows for detached participation with others, events, and 
environments nearby without invasions. With pause and 
detached participation, places in juxtaposition enable one to 
be interconnected into a network of environmental 
fabrication; the integrated whole emerges out of spatial 
sequences. 
  























neighborhoods. We as embodied entities become 
integrated with the environment by the embodied nature of 
spatial-relations (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p. 30). We 
comprehend domains we live in through bodily metaphors 
to project, navigate, and create a place. To be a place, an 
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environment has to manifest itself tangible reality 
responsive to all senses so that it can be identified as a 
distinct locality with presence. Environmental presence 
reinforces a symbolic image of a domain—“made visible, 
tangible, and sensible” (Langer, 1953 p. 95)—that is 
“Significant form” of place. We thus need vital places with 
lived sensibilities and imports to maintain our identity and to 
support life that they define for survival. 
 
If we are to survive we need to make good, healthy, quality 
places—places that are necessary for a meaningful 
existence. Without the potential for dwelling in significant 
aces, we would remain miserable in the entrails of the 
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pl
once and future Metropolis. Because we retain these 
necessities for a life worth living we can resist dying off as 
many other species have because they no longer shared 
meaningful information with their environments or the 
environments have become hostile to a species, i.e. a world 
paved over with sameness—something we might resist if 
we profess an architecture of the body, complete with all its 
senses, recognizing the complex system of body, mind, and 
place; a system of boundaries that weave in and out of the 
body and the environment, through the mind and the flesh.  
In short, if, as a profession, we invest in a thriving, 
interdependent system that embodies place within its 
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